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Abstract: How does corruption interact with inequality? To answer this question, 
we employ a ! eld experiment that examines the manner in which police of! cers in a 
major Latin American city respond to socioeconomic distinctions when requiring a 
bribe. In this experiment, four automobile drivers commit identical traf! c violations 
across a randomized sequence of crossroads, which are monitored by transit police. 
We identify the effect of citizens’ perceived wealth on of! cers’ propensity to solicit 
bribes and on the size of the bribes that they solicit. We complement our experimen-
tal results with qualitative ! ndings from interviews with police of! cers. Our core 
! nding is that of! cers are more likely to target lower class individuals and let more 
af" uent drivers off with warnings. The qualitative results suggest that of! cers as-
sociate wealth with the capacity to exact retribution and therefore are more likely to 
demand bribes from poorer individuals. We conclude that a multimethod approach 
provides a richer account of corrupt behavior than that found in most contemporary 
research.
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1. This folk saying translates to “The stone you throw depends on the size of the toad.” In 
several Latin American countries, it serves as a reminder that people are treated according 
to their position on the socioeconomic ladder.
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INTRODUCTION
Corruption, commonly understood as the abuse of public of! ce for pri-
vate gain (e.g., Rose-Ackerman 1978; Kaufmann 1997; You and Khagram 
2005), is the subject of a rapidly growing literature in political science and 
economics.2 However, the relationship between corruption and inequality 
has received less research attention. In particular, there is scant evidence 
on whether public of! cials take an individual’s income or socioeconomic 
class into account when asking for bribes. Our article addresses this par-
ticular gap in the literature by exploring corruption in the context of traf-
! c violations in a large Latin American city.
We conduct a ! eld experiment to test how traf! c police of! cers re-
spond to drivers of different income levels. In our experiment, we em-
ploy two male upper-class and two male lower-class drivers who are of 
a similar age. The class of the drivers is differentiated by their manner 
of speech, their choice of clothing, the vehicle that they drive, and phe-
notypic characteristics such as skin tone. The four drivers commit iden-
tical minor but visible traf! c violations (e.g., illegal left turns) across a 
randomized sequence of intersections monitored by transit police. We 
then observe whether of! cers stopped the driver for committing the 
infraction and, if so, whether they issued a ticket, demanded mordida (a 
bribe), or simply gave a warning. In addition, we interview a number 
of police of! cers to test the plausibility of different explanations for our 
results.
We chose to use a ! eld experiment to study the association between so-
cioeconomic status and corruption over more common approaches based 
on observational data for three reasons.3 First, survey data used in obser-
vational studies typically rely on self-reports of corrupt practices, which 
often are unreliable. Second, such data do not differentiate between bribes 
that are paid for convenience from those paid as a result of coercion from 
public of! cials. For example, a positive association between wealth and 
the payment of a bribe found in survey data may re" ect public of! cials’ 
targeting of wealthy individuals for bribes, an increased propensity for 
the rich to pay bribes out of convenience, or both. As our study aims to 
explore bribe-seeking behavior on the part of public of! cials, the inability 
to distinguish between the two possibilities is problematic. Third, to the 
extent that the likelihood of interacting with a traf! c of! cer varies with 
2. The classic de! nition comes from Joseph S. Nye (1967, 416): “[Corruption is] . . . behav-
ior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) because of 
private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains: or [which] 
violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding in" uence.”
3. Exceptions to the use of observational studies include the ! eld experiments of Ber-
trand, Djankov, Hanna, and Mullainathan (2007), Olken (2007), and Peisakhin and Pinto 
(2009).
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class, the relationship between income and corrupt behaviors might be 
driven by selection bias rather than discrimination.
We ! nd that transit police are equally likely to stop well-off and less 
well-off drivers for committing traf! c infractions. However, among those 
who are stopped, of! cers are more likely to demand a bribe from poorer 
drivers. To our surprise, not a single ticket was written. Moreover, our data 
on bribe requests suggest that of! cers expect to receive roughly the same 
payoff from stopping an upper- and a lower-class driver. Collectively, the 
results suggest that bribery places a heavier burden on the poor.
The semistructured interviews of police of! cers and experts shed light 
on the mechanisms driving our experiment’s results. Most traf! c of! -
cers believe that wealthier individuals tend to be well connected and can 
sometimes punish of! cers for issuing them tickets, even when they are 
written in response to a legitimate traf! c violation. As a result, transit po-
lice are more reluctant to seek bribes from richer individuals vis-à-vis the 
less well-off because the perceived cost of repercussions outweighs the 
greater potential payoff of extorting richer individuals.
We proceed by reviewing the existing literature on the intersection be-
tween corruption and inequality. In the subsequent section, we discuss 
our experimental methods and results. The ! nal sections present the 
qualitative survey and conclusion.
CORRUPTION AND INEQUALITY: LITERATURE REVIEW
The existing literature provides con" icting views on the relationship 
between corruption and socioeconomic status. Some scholars contend 
that bribery assists the impoverished and provides them with important 
bene! ts, such as catching a government of! cial’s elusive attention (Nye 
1967; Scott 1969). If true, this argument would make corruption seem al-
most humane.4
However, others view corruption as a useful instrument of the rich. 
This can work in two ways. First, high levels of inequality create an insti-
tutional environment that favors those with income to spare. This, in turn, 
may lead people to question the regime’s legitimacy and to circumvent 
laws and regulations with greater frequency. As a result, a norm of ille-
gally swapping cash for favors is fostered (You and Khagram 2005). Sec-
ond, corruption (similar to other mechanisms of in" uence) can lead to the 
4. There are a number of anecdotes to support the idea that a bribe payment can result in 
a humane outcome. One tells of how a community in the poor district of Iztapalapa, Mexico 
City, had to pool enough resources to bribe workers from the publicly owned electricity 
company. Otherwise, their local grid, which had been damaged by vandalism, would not 
be repaired, their refrigerated food would continue to spoil, and their children would be 
forced to continue doing their homework by candlelight.
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unequal access of goods and services (Johnston 1989). As several authors 
have noted, wealth can enable those with more resources to buy in" uence 
both legally and illegally (Kaufmann 1997; Hellman and Kaufman 2002; 
Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer 2003; de Ferranti, Perry, Ferreira, and 
Walton 2004). This kind of interaction has recently been termed inequality 
of in" uence.5
There are also different viewpoints on how bribe negotiations between 
individuals and public of! cials vary by socioeconomic class. From the 
standpoint of public of! cials, which is of particular interest to this study, 
some might expect them to prey more on wealthier individuals, who carry 
thicker wallets. In contrast, the poor could be more vulnerable as they are 
less likely to be in a position to penalize an unscrupulous of! cer.
Ultimately, as formal models of public of! cials’ decision making illus-
trate (see appendix 1), whether and how a public of! cial discriminates 
between individuals of differential socioeconomic classes when demand-
ing bribes is an empirical question. Recent research has brought some 
evidence to bear on this issue. Regarding corruption and inequality of 
in" uence more broadly, evidence from Indonesia and Uganda suggests 
that larger and more powerful ! rms are shielded from high bribery de-
mands (Robinson 1986, qtd. in Rose-Ackerman 1999; Svensson 2003). In 
Denmark, large private companies are subject to more lenient inspection 
from public of! cials (Nielsen 2006). In Nigeria, wealthier and more estab-
lished commercial traders receive fewer hassles from border of! cials (Fa-
dahunsi and Rosa 2002). In Mexico, a correspondence test showed that a 
seemingly prominent business owner with potential political connections 
systematically receives better treatment from bureaucrats working at the 
cabinet level than does an average citizen (Lagunes 2009).
Evidence at the individual level, using observational data, suggests 
that wealthier individuals are more likely to pay bribes (Guerrero and 
Rodríguez-Oreggia 2005; Hunt 2007; Hunt and Laszlo 2006). As discussed 
earlier, it is unclear whether this re" ects the targeting of wealthy individ-
uals by public of! cials or an increased propensity for the wealthy to pay 
bribes out of convenience. However, evidence that the rich are less averse 
to corrupt behavior supports the latter explanation (Gatti, Paternostro, and 
Jamele 2003). This is a key shortcoming of studies based on survey data: 
it is dif! cult to characterize the individual-of! cial interactions resulting 
in bribes with current surveys, which pose questions to the bribe payers 
5. The concepts of inequality of in" uence and differential treatment are related. The lat-
ter is understood as more lenient treatment for some than for others on the basis of some 
particular factor (Nielsen 2006). A number of studies examine differential treatment (see, 
e.g., Hebl, Bigazzi Foster, Mannix, and Dovidio 2002; Weichselbaumer 2003; Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2004; King, Hebl, Singletary, and Turner 2006). One in particular involves an 
experiment that uncovers differential treatment based on race and sex in the market for 
new cars (Ayres 1991).
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and often do not ask which party initiated the payment discussion. This 
methodology also assumes that individuals accurately report their cor-
rupt behavior. Furthermore, survey-based studies are prone to selection 
bias; for example, the association between individual income or class and 
bribe payments may, in part, re" ect the unobserved likelihood of interact-
ing with public of! cials. We circumvent these measurement and selection 
issues by conducting a ! eld experiment, described in the next section.
RESEARCH STRATEGY AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In designing our experiment, we focused on interactions with police 
of! cers in Mexico City to assess whether public of! cials differentiate on 
the basis of class when making bribe requests.6 This choice was motivated 
by anecdotal and empirical evidence on how police of! cers distinguish 
between the poor and the wealthy.7 We focus on high-visibility traf! c vio-
lations that incurred moderate ! nes (less than US$50) and could be car-
ried out with no greater risk to the confederates than that of driving in a 
busy city. This section details the experimental design and presents our 
results.
Experimental Methods
We selected three violations for exploratory work: driving without a 
license plate, driving while speaking on a cellular phone, and making il-
legal left/U-turns. As the discussion in appendix 2 illustrates, the confed-
erates were not stopped once in pilot runs focusing on the ! rst two viola-
tions. As we observed ample evidence that illegal left-turn violations were 
well policed, we designed the experiment around the third infraction.8 
6. Bribery is a common practice around much of the world. Thus, we could have con-
ducted our study in any of several large cities around the world. However, we selected 
Mexico City for two reasons. First, inequality is pervasive there: the wealthiest 10 percent 
of the country’s population receive as much income as the poorest 70 percent of households 
(Alatorre 2007; Rodriguez J. 2006). Second, Mexico City’s police force is known for its cor-
ruption. Between December 2000 and June 2006, 13 percent (or a total of 4,851) of Mexico 
City’s police of! cers were arrested for committing a crime (Fernández 2006). Moreover, 
Elena Azaola (2006) provides extensive qualitative proof of this problem.
7. One anecdote relates how a young man wearing smart clothes had a hand-to-hand 
altercation with a taxi driver of more modest appearance. The encounter ends with a police 
of! cer reprimanding the cab driver without investigating the cause of the situation. An-
other tells of a police car following a shiny, white Mercedes-Benz with polarized windows 
and no license plates. The two policemen appear to debate whether to ask the luxury car to 
pull over for two or three city blocks. They eventually opt against taking action.
8. Before conducting our experiment, we monitored police of! cers at various intersec-
tions. One encounter offers an extraordinary example of the regular enforcement on this 
P5181.indb   80 12/9/09   9:20:55 AM
CORRUPTION AND INEQUALITY AT THE CROSSROAD 81
This particular infraction was reminiscent of a test that a former Mexican 
president once ran.9
All of the illegal turns that we observed were made on large, six-lane 
roadways divided by a median. Such turns either occurred at a no-left-turn 
sign or involved going against traf! c for a few yards. Once an illegal turn 
was made, the driver had no option but to stop at the large median and 
wait for oncoming traf! c to subside before he could continue (see ! gure 1). 
Despite the small ! nes for this violation (US$25), we believe that of! cers 
enforce illegal left turns with greater frequency than the other infractions 
we considered for two reasons. First, this particular infraction is highly 
visible—even more visible than a missing license plate or expired emissions 
sticker. Second, the police of! cer, generally on foot, has an excellent oppor-
tunity to intercept the driver while the driver is stopped at the median.
We identi! ed twelve intersections that were safe for making illegal left 
turns and were usually manned by traf! c of! cers. We then hired four 
confederates to role-play the drivers of the two treatments. All confeder-
ates were similar in age (around thirty years old) and male, but the upper- 
and lower-class confederates differed in physical appearance and in their 
choice of clothing.10 Furthermore, the two lower-class confederates drove 
older, less expensive cars, while the two upper-class confederates drove 
newer, more luxurious cars.
All confederates received training and precise instructions.11 They 
followed the same protocol when interacting with police of! cers. When 
confronted by a traf! c of! cer, the drivers maintained a neutral attitude 
and stated that they did not know that the left turn that they had made 
was illegal. This allowed police of! cers to set the terms of each encounter 
and freely choose to write a ticket, give a warning, or ask for a bribe. Re-
infraction. Around seven-thirty on a weekday morning, we observed a transit of! cer talk-
ing to the driver of a pickup truck. The of! cer had stopped the driver for making an illegal 
left turn. The of! cial was probably describing the penalty for committing such an infrac-
tion when, suddenly, the driver stepped on the gas to " ee the scene. But before he drove off, 
the of! cer jumped and grabbed onto the truck—left arm inside the door, right arm holding 
onto a railing on the hood. They traveled only a few yards before a patrol car began tailing 
the truck. The latter came to a stop and the negotiations began. A few minutes later, the 
acrobatic police of! cer entered the truck. The driver shook hands with the other of! cers 
present and entered the automobile. Both the of! cer and the driver headed off—most likely 
to an ATM so that the driver could buy his way out of serious trouble.
9. In the 1950s, President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines had his chauffeur make an illegal U-turn 
in Mexico City to force local traf! c of! cers to enforce the law (Krauze 1997).
10. Drivers in this experiment had phenotypic characteristics and speaking patterns that 
re" ected the socioeconomic background associated with each treatment.
11. It is also worth noting that one of the study’s authors observed every single police-
confederate interaction from a short distance and confederates were consistently debriefed 
after each infraction was committed.
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garding this last option, a police of! cer never explicitly asked for money 
but instead said something along the lines of “We can solve this the easy 
way,” or “Together we can ! x this.” We controlled for differences in the 
drivers’ negotiating ability by having all drivers follow a similar script.12
Because of shift changes at the policed intersection, which occurred 
early in the afternoon, we allowed for two iterations of the experiment per 
day, with each driver visiting all intersections both in the morning and in 
the afternoon. The confederates drove to each intersection according to 
a predetermined, randomly assigned ordering. If in the afternoon run a 
driver observed that a police of! cer with whom an encounter had already 
occurred was still present, then that intersection was skipped. The details 
of the encounter were recorded immediately.
12. Although each driver was told to follow a script when responding to of! cers’ de-
mands, we allowed drivers enough leeway to ensure that their responses sounded natural. 
Given the possible idiosyncrasies in drivers’ responses to of! cers during the (often stress-
ful) negotiation of the bribe and the small number of interactions in which of! cers asked for 
a bribe, we have less con! dence in our data on the amount of the bribe request associated 





Figure 1 Crossroad Schematic
Note: Authors’ illustration; depicts one of the traf! c patterns commonly encountered.
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Results
Table 1 displays the main results of our experiment. Panel A of the table 
provides the raw data and panel B provides statistical comparisons test-
ing for differences between the upper- and lower-class groups. Upper- 
and lower-class drivers made thirty-three and twenty-three visits, respec-
tively. After removing instances in which the same police of! cers were 
present on the afternoon visit or when no of! cers were around, twenty-
seven upper-class and ! fteen lower-class interactions remain. Although 
the distribution of intersections visited by the drivers in each condition 
are similar, the differential sample sizes across treatment conditions may 
be a result of factors other than chance (i.e., selection effects). We address 
this possibility subsequently.
Given the observed data, what effect does socioeconomic class have on 
the propensity to demand a bribe? Before delving further into the results, 
Table 1 Results from the Main Experiment
Outcome
  Not    
 Group stopped  Stopped  Observations
      Bribe
  requested Warning Ticket
Panel A Upper class 14 6 7 0 27
 Lower class  7 7 1 0 15
   OLS regression 
 Comparisons Fisher exact test (p-value)      (p-value)*
  Two-tailed One-tailed Two-tailed One-tailed
Panel B Stopped vs. not 
  stopped 1.000 0.500  0.52
    (0.744) (0.372)
 Bribe vs. other 0.163 0.099  0.24
    (0.105) (0.052)
 Bribe vs. 
  warning|
  stopped 0.085 0.074  0.42
    (0.062) (0.031)
Notes: For the OLS regression results, estimates were taken from OLS regressions of a bi-
nary outcome variable on a dummy for lower-class driver. The dependent variable for the 
! rst comparison = 1 if the driver was stopped and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable 
for the second comparison = 1 if the driver was asked to pay a bribe and 0 for any other 
outcome (warned, not stopped). The dependent variable for the third comparison = 1 if 
the driver was asked to pay a bribe and 0 if the driver was warned. The sample in consid-
eration comprises only those whom a traf! c of! cer stopped.
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Of!cer decides if he will stop the car.
Car is not stopped and 
continues on randomized route.
52% and 42%
Driver is issued a ticket.
         0% and 0%
Key:
Bold numbers refer to observed likelihood of decision under high-class treatment
Italic numbers refer to observed likelihood of decision under low-class treatment
Warned driver continues
along randomized route.
     53.8% and 12.5%
Driver negotiates bribe according to script
and continues on randomized route.
               46.2% and 87.5%
Car is stopped, of!cer either warns driver,
issues driver a ticket, or asks for a bribe.
48% and 58%
Figure 2 A Depiction of Of! cers’ Behavior
there are two statistical issues to discuss. First, in comparing outcomes 
faced by upper- versus lower-class drivers, we use two tests of statisti-
cal signi! cance: the (nonparametric) Fisher exact test and (parametric) or-
dinary least squares regressions, which recover the difference in means 
across the two treatment groups.13 We computed the regression estimates 
by regressing the outcome variable on the treatment dummy.14 Second, we 
present both one- and two-tailed p-values in our analysis. We do this rec-
ognizing that priors may differ from reader to reader. For those who use 
the literature to form their priors, a two-tailed test may be appropriate, 
given the lack of consensus in existing research. Our initial priors, based 
on local knowledge and experience, led us to believe that police of! cers 
would offer preferential treatment to upper-class individuals. In this case, 
interpretations based on the one-tailed test are appropriate.
As panel B of table 1 and ! gure 2 illustrate, the likelihood of being 
stopped for an upper- and lower-class driver is neither substantively nor 
statistically different. Also, the probability of being asked for a bribe on 
being stopped is more than 40 percent higher for lower-class drivers, 
an effect that approaches conventional levels of signi! cance in both the 
Fisher exact and regression-based tests. These results are shown in a more 
13. The Fischer exact test is for m-by-n contingency tables with expected cell sizes of less 
than ! ve observations.
14. For the class dummy variable, lower class is assigned the value of 1 and upper class 0. 
We use the linear probability model over probit and logit speci! cations to preserve ease of 
interpretation. The choice of estimator has little bearing on our results.
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intuitive fashion in ! gure 2. The decision tree in ! gure 2 displays the like-
lihood that an of! cer will take an action conditional on a previous action 
being taken for both upper- and lower-class drivers.
As poorer drivers were asked to pay smaller bribes more frequently, 
the average amount asked did not differ signi! cantly across class. That 
is, police of! cer’s expected value for stopping the upper-class driver was 
64.62 pesos (US$6.50) and the expected value for stopping the lower class 
driver was 45 pesos (US$4.50).15 To our (and many Mexicans’) surprise, not 
a single ticket was written. We discuss the implications of this ! nding in 
the conclusion.
Finally, we would like to address the possible reasons for observing 
more upper-class than lower-class interactions with police of! cers. As 
mentioned earlier, we recovered nearly twice as many observations for 
the upper-class treatment. Although this pattern could easily arise from 
random chance, it also could indicate nonrandom selection. For example, 
other motorists may be less aggressive in their driving behavior toward 
an upper-class driver in a more expensive car, thus allowing that driver 
to proceed through the city in a relatively less obstructed fashion than a 
lower-class car and driver.
Although our data indicate that the relative propensity to visit a given 
intersection was virtually identical for both classes of drivers, we de-
cided to pursue this point more rigorously. The conventional econometric 
method of addressing selection issues is to use intersection and time-of-
day ! xed effects, which facilitate comparisons within intersection × time × 
round cells across treatments. However, such a procedure is demanding 
on the data, especially given our small sample sizes. To circumvent this 
limitation, we examine intersections where, for a given time of day and 
round, we recorded an observation for both the upper- and the lower-
class driver. This offers a robustness check of our results and a means 
to investigate differential treatment of upper- and lower-class individu-
als, holding constant the speci! c intersection, shift speci! c patterns, and 
other possible confounding factors.
We identi! ed the ten cases in which lower- and upper-class drivers 
passed through the same intersection during the same time of day and 
survey round. Of these, we focus on the seven observation pairs for which 
a traf! c of! cer stopped at least one of the drivers. Table 2 details the out-
comes experienced by the two experimental groups at each of the matched 
time of day, round, and intersection instances. The main point to note is 
that the results observed in table 1 are also observed in this restricted 
subsample: of! cers do not distinguish between rich and poor when stop-
15. After running several nonparametric tests, such as the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, on 
forty-two observations we found no statistical difference between both values (p-value = 
0.1783).
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ping a vehicle. However, they are more likely to demand a bribe from 
lower-class drivers.
WALKING THE BEAT: THE OFFICERS’ PERSPECTIVE
As discussed previously, our results indicate that traf! c of! cers are 
more likely to demand bribes from poorer drivers and give warnings to 
richer drivers. Although the use of an experiment gives us a high degree 
of con! dence that the difference observed was a result of the treatment 
(socioeconomic status), it did not indicate why this was the case. We hy-
pothesized a number of explanations and concluded that of! cers’ fear of 
repercussions from demanding bribes offered the most compelling expla-
nation of the observed behaviors. If of! cers believe that rich individuals 
are more likely to seek retribution than poor ones, then the act of stopping 
a vehicle may be intended to determine whether the driver is likely to of-
fer a bribe without causing problems.
The driver’s ability to harm the of! cer could work through two mecha-
nisms, both associated with class. First, wealthy drivers are more likely 
to have in" uence or connections that could be used to punish the of! -
cer. Even wealthy individuals without connections could be thought to 
have them. Second, the driver could take legal action by reporting the 
of! cer. An upper-class individual, likely understanding the laws and bu-
reaucracy better, is more capable of pursuing this option. We also hypoth-
esized that local understanding of class and hierarchy cause of! cers, who 
generally have lower-class backgrounds, to defer to the status associated 
with higher levels of income. We do not rule this possibility out but ! nd 
it unconvincing. If a strong norm of deference prevented of! cers from tar-
Table 2 Outcomes for Upper- and Lower-Class Observations Sharing Common 
Intersection × Round × Time of Day Cells
 Lower-Class Driver Upper-Class Driver 
      Bribe Amount      Bribe Amount
Instance Stopped requested   asked Stopped requested   asked
1 No — — Yes No —
2 Yes Yes 50 Yes No —
3 Yes Yes 100 Yes Yes 20
4 Yes Yes 50 No — —
5 Yes Yes 20 Yes No —
6 Yes Yes 50 Yes Yes 500
7 Yes Yes 100 Yes Yes 70
Notes: Instance refers to event where both groups visited the same intersection during 
the same experiment round and time of day. Amount asked refers to the amount in pesos 
requested by the traf! c of! cer in the form of a bribe.
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geting individuals who exhibit a high level of socioeconomic status, then 
why did many of! cers stop upper-class drivers in the ! rst place?
We tested the plausibility of our hypotheses by conducting interviews 
of police of! cers and local experts of security and urban affairs in Mexico 
City. Given that asking of! cers to discuss police corruption directly was 
unlikely to lead to an open response, we developed a circumspect script. 
Responses help explain the treatment effect and offer perspective on how 
the of! cers’ position in society and interaction with the public cultivates 
corrupt practices. In the rest of this section, we discuss the design of the 
interviews, explain how responses indicate that of! cers demand bribes 
from richer drivers less often to minimize repercussions, and report re-
sponses that help explain how the institutional framework of law enforce-
ment fosters corruption. Observational and interview data support the 
hypothesis that of! cers weigh the risks associated with asking for a bribe 
against the potential gain. Stopping a car allows the of! cer to gather infor-
mation before deciding whether to take a risky action.
Design
We interviewed ten of! cers.16 Seven of these supervised traf! c in streets 
comparable to those used during the experiment and carried out duties 
similar to those of of! cers stationed at the intersections used during the 
experiment. Like the of! cers encountered during the experiment, the 
respondents worked on foot at intersections where left turns are illegal. 
Moreover, like the subjects of the experiment, these of! cers strategically 
positioned themselves on the (wide) medians to stop drivers who made 
illegal turns. Realizing that transit of! cers could hesitate to discuss cor-
ruption within their ranks, we also interviewed three members of another 
police division.17
A Spanish speaker with a noticeable American accent conducted the in-
terviews to allay suspicion that responses would be used in Mexico against 
the of! cer. On approaching the police of! cer, the interviewer stated that 
he was a university student from the United States who was conducting 
research on police work in Latin America. The interviewer then inquired 
whether the of! cer would answer a few questions. The questions that 
directly relate to our experiment asked how an of! cer decides whom to 
stop given the large quantity of infractions, whether of! cers always issue 
tickets on stopping someone, and if not, what else takes place. This lat-
16. Three additional of! cers declined to respond to our questions. Of these, one simply 
said no, while the other two—fairly young of! cers—apologized and said that transit of-
! cers were under orders not to give interviews.
17. Of! cers from this division, many of whom had previously worked as transit of! cers, 
are responsible for policing banks and private businesses.
P5181.indb   87 12/9/09   9:20:57 AM
88 Latin American Research Review
ter question offered the of! cer an opportunity to mention the existence 
of bribe taking and to explain why warnings were given. If the respon-
dent did not mention that warnings are sometimes issued, the interviewer 
asked about them speci! cally. Other questions asked about how the pub-
lic treats of! cers; whether the rich treat of! cers differently than the poor 
do; how the of! cer makes class distinctions; and the respondent’s salary, 
training, and experience.
Explaining Corruption and Deference
Respondents were nearly unanimous in citing the ability of rich indi-
viduals with connections to punish the of! cer for enforcing the law. A 
number of of! cers stated that the lack of judicial support allowed well-
connected individuals to punish of! cers who issued them a citation.18 
According to these respondents, the judiciary, instead of supporting the 
police, generally sides with wealthy individuals. Respondents stated that 
of! cers risk losing their job or being sent to jail. Demetrio Sodi, an ex-
pert on urban affairs in Mexico City, corroborated this particular fear on 
the part of police of! cers. Facing such risks, police of! cers’ tendency to 
give more warnings to wealthier drivers rather than issuing tickets or de-
manding bribes seems understandable.
Many of the transit police stated that upper-class individuals have a 
better understanding of the laws and often attempt to argue their way out 
of a ticket. Thus, whether maximizing law enforcement, as many of! cers 
claimed, or bribes, of! cers likely expect that interactions with upper-class 
individuals are more time consuming and arduous than interactions with 
lower-class drivers.19 Of! cers agreed on the traits that differentiate upper-
class and lower-class individuals, though the characteristics that received 
greatest emphasis varied. The most important factors cited were manner 
of speaking, manner of dress, and type and condition of car. We are con! -
dent that the treatment employed in the experiment exhibited signi! cant 
variation in each of these categories.
The respondents provided less insight on the haphazard enforcement 
of illegal left turns. Police of! cers claimed that practicality determined 
whom they stopped. Many drivers show little respect for of! cers. In de-
termining when to enforce the law, of! cers consider the possibility that 
drivers would seek to evade punishment, potentially harming the of! cer 
18. The exact phrase used was apoyo judicial (literally “judicial support,” it was used to 
refer to the lack of support from the judiciary), though one of! cer also referred to the prepo-
tencia (authoritarian attitude) of the rich.
19. Over the course of the experiment, we regularly observed of! cers claim that the le-
gal sanction associated with an infraction was much more serious than the law actually 
stated.
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in the process. As we observed ! rsthand, drivers sometimes attempt to 
pull away from the of! cer (see infra note 8.) A number of of! cers cited this 
practice and stated that it is not worth writing a ticket for someone who 
runs off, though one of! cer countered that a new system that forces driv-
ers to pay for outstanding tickets before being allowed to renew their car’s 
registration should alter the balance of power.
The interviews yielded interesting responses in regards to corruption. 
As one of! cer explained, “Here there is clientelism.” 20 Many superiors 
demand kickbacks for plum posts. He also described how people with 
in" uence and connections threaten of! cers, call their connections while 
an of! cer is trying to write them a ticket, or use other means to show 
evidence of their in" uence. In clear contradiction to our empirical ! nd-
ings, the other police of! cers interviewed stated that of! cers always give 
tickets on stopping a driver. When asked about warnings, most respon-
dents admitted that of! cers give warnings, at times because of intimida-
tion from the driver. The one exception was a pair of of! cers who claimed 
that warnings are given only in emergencies and that only ministers are 
able to use their in" uence to get out of a ticket. However, other of! cers 
stated that warnings are frequently used to get out of a sticky situation. 
Although we did not expect of! cers to openly discuss bribe taking, one 
transit of! cer and the nontransit of! cers did refer to corrupt practices and 
described them as an important source of income for many police of! cers. 
This transit of! cer believed that a substantial minority of of! cers become 
police of! cers seeking income from bribes, while the nontransit of! cers 
stated that petty bribery was particularly rampant among transit of! cers 
because of the frequent opportunities they have to demand bribes.
The Broader Context
One transit of! cer’s responses were particularly intriguing. Although 
other of! cers sometimes ended an interview to take a break or make a 
phone call, this of! cer responded fully to the questions and, on our con-
clusion of the interview, appeared genuinely pleased to have the oppor-
tunity to share his thoughts on the problems of policing in Mexico. This 
of! cer’s remarks were generally in accordance with those made by others 
but far more detailed, and they offer an intriguing portrayal of how insti-
tutional practices encourage corrupt behavior.
Although some of! cers joined the force seeking a steady salary or be-
cause many in their family were already in the police ranks, this of! cer 
sought work in law enforcement because he considered it an honorable 
career. However, he displayed obvious frustration that the police did not 
live up to his original expectations. He described pressures to conform 
20. Authors’ translation.
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to the corrupt status quo as emanating from three directions: a system in 
which higher-ranking of! cers expect kickbacks from their subordinates, 
a public that would rather pay a quick bribe than deal with the expense 
and hassle of a ticket, and fellow of! cers. He did not state how this latter 
group pressures others to be corrupt. However, expectations likely play 
a role, especially when many of! cers follow relatives in choosing law en-
forcement. In addition, a clean of! cer likely would be a pariah in a pool of 
dirty of! cers, especially when corrupt practices extend far beyond those 
we study.
Other of! cers concurred that law enforcement in Mexico is a job, not 
a career like it is in the United States. This sentiment indicates a broader 
attitude that precludes the self-sacri! ce and risk taking needed to under-
mine corrupt practices. When asked about how the public treats of! cers, 
many of! cers stated that, regardless of class, the public is fairly divided 
between those who show respect and those who do not. Again, if Mexi-
cans held a strong sense of status-based deference, we would expect that 
of! cers would observe class distinctions in how the public treated them.
In Mexico, disrespect for public authority lowers police of! cers’ morale, 
breeds apathy, and places of! cers in physical danger. Risk of harm comes 
from other directions as well—of! cers frequently cited the menace that 
organized crime and poor training pose.21 Their salary places them at the 
bottom end of the middle class but pales in comparison to the take avail-
able from petty corruption. Considering the poor pay they receive, signi! -
cant danger they face, and widespread expectations that they will behave 
corruptly, honest of! cers face almost overwhelming pressures to conform 
and participate in corrupt institutions.
An Assessment
The interviews discussed in this section are more suggestive than con-
clusive. Small in number, they may not represent the broader attitudes in 
the police force, though respondents came from diverse age groups and 
provided varied answers. As many of! cers clearly failed to respond truth-
fully to some questions, the reliability of our analysis depends on our 
ability to ! lter out prevarications. However, we have additional sources 
of information. A much smaller leap of faith is required to trust an of! cer 
whose responses conform to outside observations than to wade through 
inconsistencies more generally. By asking more direct questions of of! cers 
who glossed over the issuance of warnings, a consensus emerged. Neither 
interview responses nor experimental results support the hypothesis that 
21. Of! cers receive limited training before joining the police and bear most of the costs 
of maintaining their readiness. A shooting range is available, but of! cers must pay for their 
own bullets.
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of! cers focus on poorer drivers out of deference to richer individuals. Of! -
cers face the possibility of retribution if they cite a well-connected individ-
ual and often issue warnings to protect themselves. Of! cers’ position in so-
ciety is such that corrupt practices are easy to maintain by those (e.g., senior 
of! cers and of! cials) who bene! t the most from them. And of! cers’ percep-
tion that the rich are able to punish them for issuing citations explains their 
greater propensity to give warnings to upper-class individuals.
CONCLUSION
In this study, we examine how corruption works at the individual level 
through a multimethod approach that focuses on whether and how police 
of! cers respond to class distinctions. In our experiments, we ! nd that po-
lice of! cers enforce the law selectively. Of! cers do not punish the violators 
of many traf! c laws. When they enforce a particular law, of! cers do so 
only sporadically and with apparent disregard for class. However, once 
an of! cer stops a driver, class distinctions clearly arise. Of! cers are more 
likely to demand bribes from poorer individuals and to let richer indi-
viduals off with a warning. In contrast, of! cers expect the upper-class in-
dividuals from whom they demand a bribe to make a larger payment. On 
the basis of the data on the quantity that police of! cers demand, of! cers 
should, on average, expect the same amount from lower- and upper-class 
individuals, but their demands at any particular interaction vary system-
atically along class lines. Still, poorer drivers who interact with police 
should expect to pay a larger share of their income than richer drivers. 
If this holds true across the population more generally, then corruption 
imposes a disproportionate burden on the poor.
We explore these results in open-ended interviews. The poor pay, high 
risk, limited accountability, and low prestige of police work may explain 
our observations. Of! cers appear to show a higher propensity to warn 
wealthier individuals because they fear that those individuals may exact 
retribution if the of! cers take more signi! cant action. And in cases where 
they do risk the consequences of a wealthy driver’s desire for revenge, of-
! cers demand a larger payoff.22
A corollary to our study is the distinct advantages that different meth-
ods offered in answering various aspects of our question. Although sur-
veys of expert and public perceptions have improved our understanding 
of corruption’s macro effects, these tools seem less suited for describing 
how corrupt practices play out at the micro level. More speci! cally, even 
22. In appendix 2, we model the situation in which of! cers must consider both the risk 
of being caught and the risk that a driver will pursue extrajudicial means of punishing the 
of! cer. Of! cers perceive this latter risk as positively associated with class and thus hesitate 
to seek bribes from the rich and demand more when they do.
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a well-designed and implemented study such as that conducted by Trans-
parencia Mexicana does not provide controls that enable a researcher to 
parse out distinctions in outcomes that result from differences in public 
(in our case class) behavior or that of public of! cials. This particular sur-
vey suggests that the wealthy are more likely to pay a bribe, but it does 
not indicate whether this is out of convenience or because of a tendency of 
police of! cers to target them. And, as is the case for surveys more broadly, 
analysis based on Transparencia Mexicana’s data assumes that percep-
tions accurately re" ect reality. However, the Mexicans with whom we dis-
cussed our experiment were shocked to learn that, during the course of 
our research, of! cers failed to respond to hundreds of infractions and did 
not issue a single ticket. We do not deny the value of surveys; they have 
and will continue to re" ect broad trends. Yet we found that the combina-
tion of experimental and qualitative methods offer a more precise and 
context-rich means of investigating how corruption works at the individ-
ual level.
As is the case in much of the world, corruption places a signi! cant bur-
den on a wide swath of Mexico’s population. Casual observation alone 
indicates that the presence of tens of thousands of of! cers in Mexico City 
does little to promote adherence to the traf! c laws. Even though of! cers 
are poorly paid, the state is assumed to devote signi! cant resources to po-
licing to promote law and order—conditions considered highly conducive 
to development. Instead, of! cers’ apathy and occasional extortion likely 
contribute to a lack of respect for low-level legal institutions and may pro-
mote criminality more broadly. As is the case with crime in general, the 
poor bear the brunt of police corruption.
APPENDIX 1: A FORMAL APPROACH TO EXPLAINING INEQUALITY AND CORRUPTION
In the classic principal-agent-client model of corruption, the principal is 
a government of! cial, the agent is the public of! cial responsible to the prin-
cipal for law enforcement, and the client is the individual or ! rm (Becker 
and Stigler 1974; Rose-Ackerman 1978; Mishra 2006). These models often 
re" ect the perverse institutions that create an environment that promotes 
corruption between the agent and the client. However, as discussed in the 
main text and herein, these models do not generate predictions about how 
the client’s class affects the principal’s behavior or the manner in which 
the agent and client reach corrupt forms of cooperation.
In our study, the principal is the government, the agent is the traf! c 
of! cer, and the client is the driver of the vehicle. Following Becker (1968) 
and Becker and Stigler (1974), a model of of! cer’s decision making can 
be described as follows: let w be the of! cer’s (agent’s) wage. If the of! cer 
commits an act of corruption, such as extorting a bribe from the client, he 
receives an amount b in addition to w. Let p be the probability of being 
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caught committing an act of corruption and c the penalty. If those who 
commit corruption are ! red from their jobs, then c represents the (pre-
sumably lower) wage earned in alternate employment.
The expected value of acting corrupt is:
 p × c + (1 − p)(w + b) (1)
A rational agent would be corrupt when Equation (1) exceeds the wage w. 
According to this model, the likelihood of committing a corrupt act de-
clines as the probability and penalty of being caught increase.
In our study, we seek distinctions in how traf! c of! cers behave toward 
members of upper and lower socioeconomic classes. Given our study’s 
design, the relevant model becomes:
 pL × cL + (1 − pL)(w + bL), and (2)
 pH × cH + (1 − pH)(w + bH), (3)
where the subscripts L and H represent lower and upper class, respec-
tively. If the expected value of committing a corrupt act is not equal across 
socioeconomic classes, we would expect that traf! c of! cers’ propensity to 
extort bribes would vary across these groups.
A decision tree offers another means of understanding of! cers’ behav-
ior. Figure 2 depicts the two choices of! cers make: to stop a car commit-
ting an infraction and to issue a warning, demand a bribe, or write a ticket 
to the drivers that they decide to stop. We assume that of! cers incorporate 
the information available to them when choosing a course of action. The 
appearance of the car and driver inform the of! cer’s decision to stop a car. 
Should an of! cer decide to stop a car, the demeanor of the driver offers ad-
ditional information that enables the of! cer to weigh the potential payoff 
from demanding a bribe against the likelihood and potential cost of the 
driver causing trouble for the of! cer. The likelihood that an of! cer will 
stop the driver and, conditional on doing so, issue a warning, bribe, or 
ticket, are indicated in bold for upper-class drivers and in italics for lower-
class drivers. In addition, while ! gure 2 displays the overall likelihood of 
observing a speci! c action by an of! cer, some of! cers behaved differently 
than others. In other words, of! cers’ responses to the treatments indicate 
that they held a range of preferences for risk and reward.
APPENDIX 2: PILOT RUNS
In the initial phase of our research, we explored several traf! c viola-
tions as potential bases for our experimental design. This appendix de-
scribes our observations and results pertaining to the two infractions—
driving without a front license plate and driving while speaking on the 
cell phone—which we chose not to move forward with. For both infrac-
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tions, we began by randomly assigning the upper-class driver and car 
and the lower-class driver and car to the time of day. Following the time 
assignment, each drove through the same 120-mile route, which we se-
lected to maximize the concentration of traf! c police who could observe 
the driver commit one of two traf! c violations.
Our ! rst pilot experiment involved removing a license plate from both 
the upper- and the lower-class car. The rationale was that local transit 
laws are very explicit regarding the proper exhibition of a car’s license 
plates.23 Any car that does not have a front or rear license plate is subject 
to a midlevel ! ne (approximately US$50). Moreover, this is not a common 
infraction. After examining the cars in a parking lot, only 6 out of 203 
(or 3 percent) were observed without a license plate. Finally, local transit 
laws demand that of! cials stop any vehicle when its driver commits an 
infraction.24 Thus, given the visibility and low frequency of this particular 
violation, we expected that of! cers would frequently stop the drivers who 
participated in this experiment.
The other infraction that we tried was appearing to use a cellular phone 
while driving, given that local traf! c laws are also explicit on this matter.25 
Drivers who use a cell phone while driving are subject to a low-level ! ne 
(approximately US$25). Using the same route and randomization from 
our prior experiment, we tested this particular violation with the upper-
class treatment. The outcomes recorded from all trials are organized in 
appendix table 1.
To our chagrin, not one of the hundreds of police of! cers (most of whom 
were on foot) attempted to intercept the drivers. One could believe that this 
is a case of justice—literally—being blind, but this result also involved an 
important element of negligence. We found that police of! cers often were 
not focused on their duties. Several of them were observed chatting on 
their personal cell phones, joking with their partners, or savoring a ham-
burger midway through the day. We also observed of! cers watching the 
national team play in the World Cup at the stalls of nearby street vendors. 
In addition, even police of! cers who were attentive to the " ow of traf! c 
did not enforce the law. For example, at one point, the upper-class driver 
approached a street corner with a police of! cer while pretending to talk 
on his cellular phone. The light at the intersection was red and the of! cer 
asked the driver to pull back a few feet to make room for oncoming traf-
! c. After complying, the driver and the of! cer sustained eye contact. Al-
though one would expected the of! cer to take note of the violation and ask 
the driver to roll down his window, he actually raised his hand and waved 
to the driver in a clear gesture of gratitude for having moved the car back.
23. See Article 38 of the Reglamento de Tránsito del Distrito Federal.
24. See Article 55 of the Reglamento de Tránsito del Distrito Federal.
25. See Article 82-VIII of the Reglamento de Tránsito del Distrito Federal.
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